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Abstract
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spa-
tial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with
their neighbors. We derive integro-diﬀerential equations as deterministic ap-
proximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This generalizes
the known mean-ﬁeld ordinary diﬀerential equations and provide a powerful
tool to investigate the spatial eﬀects in populations evolution. The determin-
istic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the evolution of
strategy proﬁles in a population, such as standing and traveling waves, and
pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions.
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Many macroeconomic phenomena occur as the aggregate results of the actions and
interactions of many and unrelated agents. Interactions among agents are inherently
local because they are separated by spatial location, language, culture, and etc. As an
example the occurrence of depression or inﬂation might depend on the decentralized
decisions of many agents to save or consume based on the local economic conditions.
Another example of a social phenomenon where spatial considerations matter is the
decision on where to live, which frequently depends on the neighbors living there
and this, in turn, can induce the spatial patterns of segregation in residential areas
(Schelling, 1971). Our main goal in this paper is to develop tools to understand the
implications of spatial interactions in evolutionary games.
We consider a class of spatial stochastic processes in which agents are located on
vertices of a graph and update their strategy after observing the strategy of a dis-
tinguished set of their neighbors. Such stochastic models have been studied in evo-
lutionary game theory by, among others, Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993), Ellison
(1993), Blume (1993), Blume (1995), Young (1998). In mean-ﬁeld models without any
consideration of geometrical proximity (e.g., see Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)),
every player is considered a neighbor and is given the same weight in evaluating pay-
oﬀs and the model can be described using only the aggregate quantities such as the
proportion of players with a given strategy.
The popular use of mean-ﬁeld stochastic models in evolutionary game theory is
mainly due to the simple structure of the stochastic processes. While these models
demonstrate eﬀectively how the combination of the myopic strategy revision and the
random experiments (noise or mutation) of individuals can lead to a selection of an
equilibrium from among multiple Nash equilibria, they assume that everyone in a
population interacts uniformly with the entire population of players, neglecting the
local structure of interaction. Because of this, these models fail to address the im-
portance of the locality of interactions in forming the globally observed phenomenon.
The range of interaction itself is a critical factor in determining the speed of conver-
gence to equilibrium and the time that the society locked in a “bad” state such as
Pareto-ineﬃcient state. For instance, Ellison (1993) shows that the speed of conver-
gence in the system with the uniform interaction in a large population is very slow
and so the question of equilibrium selection in the mean ﬁeld models may not yield
2a useful insight.
By contrast, in models with local interactions players interact with a ﬁxed ﬁnite
set of neighbors (e.g., see Blume (1993), Blume (1995), Young (1998, Chapter 5) and
see Szabo and Fath (2007) for a comprehensive survey of spatial evolutionary games).
Some important questions about equilibrium selection and speed of convergence to
equilibrium have been addressed for special models using tools such as stochastic sta-
bility and Gibbs measures (Young (1993),Ellison (1993),Blume (1993), Young (1998),
See also Freidlin and Wentzell (1984)). These results are however limited to either po-
tential games and logit dynamics or coordinations games and perturbed best response
dynamics; many other important games addressing economic problems − such as the
Rock-paper-scissors games − are neither potential games nor coordination games.
Also another important behavioral rule like imitative updating, which may arise from
the limited information or poor computational ability of agents, might exhibit very
diﬀerent phenomena and should be compared to the (perturbed) best response rule
(See Levine and Pesendorfer (2007); Bergin and Bernhardt (2009) for the importance
of imitative behaviors). However, these questions using stochastic and probabilistic
methods lead to very diﬃcult problems (e.g. see Durrett (1999)).
We concentrate here on an intermediate case, local mean-ﬁeld models where a
given player interacts with a substantial proportion of the population, but where
spatial variations in the strength of interactions are nonetheless allowed. By consid-
ering the intermediate model, we are able to rigorously derive deterministic equations
which approximate the original stochastic processes. The distinctive advantages of
our approaches lie in that under our assumptions, the questions of pattern formations,
equilibrium selection, and the speed of convergence at the level of complex stochastic
processes can be directly translated into those at the level of the diﬀerential equations
- a level which is more tractable and also incorporates some underlying stochastic de-
tails. An attractive feature of the derived diﬀerential equations is that it can provide
tractable and systematic tools which can examine the relationship between the lo-
cal heterogeneity and the globally observed phenomena; for example, one can easily
study how a given set of preferences of individuals at a certain neighborhood can lead
to segregation patterns in the residential areas.
In the current literature of evolutionary game theory, (e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund
(2003); Weibull (1995); Sandholm (2010)), the time evolution of the proportion of
agents with strategy i at time t, ft(i), is speciﬁed by an ordinary diﬀerential equation
3of the type
∂
∂t
ft(i) =
 
k∈S
c
M(k,i,ft)ft(k) − ft(i)
 
k∈S
c
M(i,k,ft) for i ∈ S. (1)
Examples of such equations include the well-known replicator dynamics, the von-
Neumann Nash dynamics, and the logit dynamics. The ﬁrst term in equation (1)
describes the rate at which agents switch to strategy i from some strategy other than
i, while the second term describes the rate at which agents switch to some other
strategy from strategy i. For this reason equation (1) is also called an input-output
equation.
It is well-known (Kurtz, 1970; Benaim and Weibull, 2003; Darling and Norris,
2008) that the solution of equation (1) ft(i) approximates, on ﬁnite time intervals, a
suitable mean-ﬁeld stochastic process, in the limit of inﬁnite population, and ft(i) is
the average, over the entire spatial domain, of the proportion of player with strategy
i. In our local mean-ﬁeld model where spatial structures survive, we will describe
instead the state of the system by a local density function ft(u,i). Here u belongs
to the spatial domain A ⊂ Rn where agents are continuously distributed and ft(u,i)
represents the proportion of agents with strategy i at the spatial location u. Our
main result is that local mean-ﬁeld stochastic processes are approximated, on ﬁnite
time intervals and in the limit of inﬁnite population, by equations of the type
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) =
 
k∈S
c(u,k,i,ft)ft(u,k) − ft(u,i)
 
k∈S
c(u,i,k,ft) for i ∈ S , (2)
which provides a natural generalization of equation (1). For example, the term
c(u,k,i,f) describes the rate at which agents at spatial location u switch from strat-
egy k to i. This rate depends on the strategies of agents at other spatial locations
and typically, c(u,k,i,f) will have the functional form
c(u,k,i,f) = G(k,i,J ∗ f(u,i)), where J ∗ f(u,i) :=
 
J(u − v)f(v,i)dv.
Here J ∗ f is the convolution product of J with f and J(u) is a non-negative
probability kernel which describes the interaction strength between players whose
relative distance is u. When J is constant equation (2) reduces to equation (1). Note
that the rate of increases in ft at u depends on ft(v,i) for all v in the spatial domain
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(a) Traveling front (b) Imitative update vs perturbed best response
Figure 1: Traveling front and strategy choices Panel (a) illustrates how a traveling
front solution can describe the propagation of a strategy to the whole spatial domain for a two
strategy game. Panel (b) shows the conﬁgurations of strategy choices of individuals at each site
(white circle: strategy 1, black circle: strategy 2) In the replicator dynamics (the left: an example
of imitative updating rules) the interface between the choices of strategies is sharp; in the logit
dynamics (the right: an example of perturbed best response rules) the interface is not sharp
A and that equation (2) is non-local; so, the equation is called an integro-diﬀerential
equation (IDE).
We will obtain this equation in a suitable spatial scaling where agents are con-
tinuously distributed in a spatial domain A and is often called a mesoscopic scaling
in the physics literature. For this reason equations of the form (2) are often called
mesoscopic equations but are sometimes also referred to as local mean-ﬁeld equa-
tions. Mesoscopic limits similar to ours have been derived in several models in sta-
tistical mechanics by Comets (1987), DeMasi, Orlandi, Presutti, and Triolo (1994),
Katsoulakis, Plechac, and Tsagkarogiannis (2005), and others. We generalize these
results to the spatial stochastic processes arising in evolutionary game theory. Other
scaling limits, such as hydrodynamic limits, where space and time are scaled simulta-
neously, giving rise to evolving fronts and interfaces, e.g. Katsoulakis and Souganidis
(1997), are also potentially relevant to game theory but will not be discussed here.
Speciﬁcally, using this approximated equation we study the eﬀect of a given initial
condition and behavioral update rule on pattern formations and observe that when
individuals behave by imitation of their close neighbors, the segregation of choices of
strategy may develop and persist (see Figure 2). But in a society where (perturbed)
best response rule is the dominating behavior, we observe that the system, instead,
converges everywhere to a “rational” equilibrium exponentially fast (see Figure 1(b)
for comparison of interfaces). The traveling front solutions shows a propagation of a
local strategy proﬁle into a global domain of the space and plays an important role in
examining the selection of equilibrium from among multiple Nash equilibria and the
5Figure 2: Pattern Formation in the replicator dynamics We use two-player coordi-
nation game with a11 = 2/3,a22 = 1/3, a12 = a21 = 0. The left and middle panels show the time evo-
lutions of population densities of strategy 1 in the spatial domain T d = [−π,π]2. The number of nodes
is 64 and the time step is 0.0175. The initial conditions are 1/3 + randcos(x)cos(y) (upper panel)
and 1/3+randcos(2x)cos(2y) (lower panel), where rand denotes a realization of the uniform random
variable [0,1] at each node. For the interaction kernel, J (r) = exp
 
−bx2 
/
 
exp(−bx2)dx,b = 15.
The right panels show the contours of the densities at t = 22.
speed of convergence to equilibrium (see Figure 1 (a), Hofbauer, Hutson, and Vickers
(1997)). In our models, in imitative dynamics, we observe an extremely slow transition
to the better equilibrium in contrast to standard beliefs on equilibrium selection.
Current approaches to address the pattern formation and the existence of traveling
front solutions in evolutionary games have traditionally employed reaction-diﬀusion
partial diﬀerential equations; such models are typically obtained by adding a constant
coeﬃcient diﬀusion term to the mean-ﬁeld equations, which in turn models fast but
homogeneous spatial diﬀusion of agents(Hutson and Vickers, 1992; Vickers, Hutson, and Budd,
1993; Hofbauer, Hutson, and Vickers, 1997; Hofbauer, 1997; Durrett, 1999):
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) =
 
k∈S
c
M(k,i,f)ft(u,k) − ft(u,i)
 
k∈S
c
M(i,k,f) + ǫ∆f. (3)
In contrast, in our scaling-limit approach, the spatial eﬀects are introduced at the
microscopic level and lead to diﬀusive eﬀects which diﬀer markedly from equation to
equation and are, in general, density dependent. This introduces a number of new
interesting spatial structures which are absent in reaction-diﬀusion equations.
6The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the stochastic process
and the scaling limits, and present our main results (Section 2.3). A heuristic deriva-
tion of the equation is given in Section 2.4 and the relation with ODE such as (1) is
elucidated in Section 2.5. In Section 3 we analyze equilibrium selection and pattern
formation in two player coordination games using a combination of linear analysis
and numerical simulations. In the appendix we prove our main results.
2 Spatial Evolutionary Games
2.1 Strategy Revision Processes
In models of spatial evolutionary games, agents are located at the sites of a graph
and play a normal form game with their neighbors. The graph Λ is assumed here to
be a subset of the integer lattice Zd. We consider a single population playing a normal
form game, but the generalization to multiple population games is straightforward.
A normal form game is speciﬁed by a ﬁnite set of strategies S and a payoﬀ function
a(i,j) which gives the payoﬀ for a player using strategy i ∈ S against strategy j ∈ S.
Here we view a strategy as a type of behavior and so terms, “strategy” and “type”,
are used interchangeably (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998).
The strategy of the agent at site x ∈ Λ is σΛ (x) ∈ S, and we denote by σΛ =
{σΛ(x) : x ∈ Λ} the conﬁguration of strategies for every agent in the population. With
these notations, the state space, i.e., the set of all possible conﬁgurations, is SΛ. The
subscript of σ = σΛ will be suppressed, whenever no confusion arises. As in Young
(1998, chapter 6), we assign positive weights W(x − y) to any two sites x and y to
capture the importance or intensity of the interaction among neighbors. Note that
we assume that these weights depend only on the relative location x−y between the
players (i.e., we assume translation invariance). It is convenient to assume that total
weight that site x attaches to all its neighbors is normalized to 1, i.e.,
 
y∈Λ
W(x − y) ≈ 1. (4)
We say y is a neighbor of x whenever W(x − y) > 0. An individual agent, at site x
7with strategy i given a conﬁguration σ, receives an average payoﬀ
u(x,σ,i) :=
 
y∈Λ
W(x − y)a(i,σ(y)). (5)
If we think of W as the probability with which an agent samples his neighbors, then
u(x,σ,i) is the expected payoﬀ for an agent at x choosing strategy i if the popula-
tion strategy proﬁle is σ. Or we can think that an agent receives an instantaneous
payoﬀ ﬂow from his interactions with other neighbors (Blume, 1993; Young, 1998;
Young and Burke, 2001).
In the special case where W(x − y) is constant, the interaction is uniform and
there is no spatial structure and if there are a total of nd agents in the population,
then W(x − y) ≈ 1
nd because of (4). On the other hand, when W(x − y) = 1
2d if
 x − y  = 1 and 0 otherwise, interactions only arise between nearest sites (Blume,
1995; Szabo and Fath, 2007).
In this paper we concentrate on long range interactions where each agent interacts
with as many other agents as in the mean-ﬁeld case, but the interaction is not uniform.
This limit is known as “local mean ﬁeld model” (Comets, 1987) or “Kac potential”
(Lebowitz and Penrose, 1966; DeMasi, Orlandi, Presutti, and Triolo, 1994; Presutti,
2009). More speciﬁcally, let J(x) be a non-negative, compactly supported, and inte-
grable function such that
 
J(x)dx = 1. We assume that W has the form:
W
γ(x − y) = γ
dJ(γ(x − y)), (6)
and we will take the limit Λ ր Zd and γ → 0 in such a way that γ−d ≈ |Λ| ≈ nd.
Here nd is the size of the population and | | denotes the cardinality. Hence the factor
γd is chosen in such a way that
 
Wγ(x − y) ≈
 
J(x)dx = 1, so Wγ(x − y) indeed
represents the intensity of interactions. Note that in (6) the interaction vanishes when
 x − y  ≥ Rγ−1 if J is supported on the ball of radius R. So as γ → 0, an agent
interacts very weakly but with a growing number of neighbors in the population.
Frequently, in examples and simulations, we consider localized Gaussian-like kernels
J(x) ∝ exp(−b x 
2) for some b > 0.
The time evolution of the system is given by a continuous time Markov process
{σt} with state space SΛ, in which each agent receives, independently of all the other
agents, a strategy revision opportunity in response to his own exponential “alarm
8clock” with rate 1, and then updates his strategy according to a rate c(x,σ,k) − the
rate with which agent x switches to strategy k when the conﬁguration is σ. This
process is then characterized by a generator
(Lg)(σ) =
 
x∈Λ
 
k∈S
c(x,σ,k)
 
g(σ
x,k) − g(σ)
 
(7)
where g is a bounded function on SΛ and
σ
x,k(y) =
 
σ(y) if y  = x
k if y = x
represents a conﬁguration where the agent at site x switches from his current strategy
σ(x) to a new strategy k.
If c(x,σ,k) > 0 for all x, σ and k, the stochastic process can introduce any new
strategy, even if it is not currently used in the population. We call this case innovative
following Szabo and Fath (2007). If c(x,σ,k) = 0 for some x, σ, and k and hence a
strategy which is not present in the population does not appear under the dynamics,
we call the dynamics non-innovative. Furthermore if, upon switching, agents only
consider the payoﬀ of the new strategy we call the dynamics targeting. In contrast,
when agents’ decision depends on the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the current strategy
and the new strategy we call the dynamics comparing.
Precise technical assumptions for the strategy revision rates will be discussed
later (Conditions C1−C3 in Section 2.3); here, we give only a number of concrete
examples commonly used in applications, and to which our results will apply. Several
more examples of rates are discussed in the Appendix and the assumptions on our
rates are satisﬁed by virtually all dynamics commonly used in evolutionary game
theory (see Sandholm, 2010, for a more comprehensive discussion of rates and more
examples). To deﬁne the rate we introduce
w(x,σ,k) :=
 
y∈Λ
W(x − y)δ(σ(y),k)
where δ(i,j) = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise; w(x,σ,k) can be interpreted as the proba-
bility for an agent at site x to ﬁnd a neighbor with strategy k, provided the neighbors
are sampled with the probability distribution W(x − y). Let also F denote a non-
9negative function.
Examples of Rates
• Comparing and Innovative: The rate is c(x,σ,k) = F(u(x,σ,k)−u(x,σ,σ(x)))
and is comparing and innovative provided F > 0. When
c(x,σ,k) = min{1,exp(u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ(x)))},
the rate corresponds to a generalization of the well-known Metropolis algorithm.
In particular, when the normal form game is a potential game, the corresponding
Markov chain satisﬁes detailed balance and its invariant distribution can be explicitly
expressed as a Gibbs distribution (Szabo and Fath, 2007).
• Targeting and Innovative: This case arises if c(x,σ,k) = F(u(x,σ,k)) and
F > 0. If
c(x,σ,k) =
exp(u(x,σ,k))
 
l exp(u(x,σ,l))
(8)
the rate is called “logit choice rule” in the game theory literature, and it is a general-
ization of the “Gibbs sampler” in statistics and of the “Glauber dynamics ”of physics.
The Markov process, in this case too, satisﬁes the detailed balance for potential games
and has the same Gibbs invariant distribution as Metropolis dynamics.
• Comparing and Non-innovative: The rate has the form
c(x,σ,k) = w(x,σ,k)[F(u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ(x))] . (9)
This speciﬁes an imitation process: the ﬁrst factor w(x,σ,k) is the probability for an
agent at x to choose an agent with strategy k and the second factor F(u(x,σ,k) −
u(x,σ,σ(x))) gives the rate at which the new strategy k is adopted (Weibull, 1995;
Benaim and Weibull, 2003; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 2003). The standard example is
c(x,σ,k) = w(x,σ,k)[u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ(x))]+ (10)
where [s]+ = max{s,0}. The rate (10), in the mean-ﬁeld case, gives rise to the
famous replicator ODEs as the deterministic approximation. More generally if F in
(9) satisﬁes
F(s) − F(−s) = s, (11)
10then the corresponding mean ﬁeld ODE is the replicator dynamics. Note that [s]+
satisﬁes condition (11). In the paper we frequently use
Fκ (s) :=
1
κ
log(exp(κs) + 1) (12)
and it is easily seen that the function (12) satisﬁes (11) and converges uniformly to
[s]+ as κ → ∞; hence (12) can serve as a smooth regularization of (10), and we name
a replicator equation using (12) by a regularized replicator equation.
2.2 Mesoscopic scaling and long-range interactions
We will consider the limit γ → 0 in equation (6); i.e., the interaction range
1
γ
becomes inﬁnite and the agent at x interacts with a growing number of agents. In
order to obtain a limiting equation, we rescale space and take a continuum limit.
Let A ⊂ R
d (mesoscopic domain) and Aγ := γ−1A ∩ Z
d (microscopic domain). If A
is a smooth region in Rd, then Aγ contains γ−d|A| lattice sites and as γ → 0, γAγ
approximates A.
At the mesoscopic scale the state of the system is described by the strategy proﬁle
function ft(u,i) – the density of agents with strategy i at u. The bridge between
microscopic and mesoscopic scale is given by the empirical measure πγ(σ;du,di) de-
ﬁned as follows. For (v,j) ∈ A × S, let δ(v,j)(du,di) denote the Dirac delta measure
at (v,j).
Deﬁnition 1 (Empirical measure) The empirical measure πγ : SAγ → P(A × S)
is the map given by
σ  → π
γ(σ;du,di) :=
1
|Aγ|
 
x∈Aγ
δ(γx,σ(x))(dudi) (13)
where P(A × S) denotes the set of all probability measures on A × S.
Our main result is to show that, under suitable conditions,
π
γ(σt;du,di) → ft(u,i)du in probability (14)
and ft(u,i) satisﬁes an integro-diﬀerential equation. Since σt is the state of the micro-
scopic system at time t, πγ(σt;du,di) is a random measure, while ft(u,i) is a solution
11of a deterministic equation. So (14) is in a sense a form of a time-dependent law of
large numbers. For this result to hold we need to assume that the initial distribution
for σ0 is suﬃciently regular. For our purpose it will be enough to assume that the
distribution of σ0 is given by a product measure with a slowly varying parameter.
Deﬁnition 2 (Product measures with a slowly varying parameter) The col-
lection of measure { γ} is called a family of product measures with a slowly varying
parameter if  γ :=
 
x∈Aγ ρx on SAγ
and there exists a proﬁle f(u,i) such that
ρx ({i}) = f(γx,i)
More general initial distributions can also be accommodated (See Kipnis and Landim,
1999), provided they can be associated to a mesoscopic strategy proﬁle. Furthermore,
below we will consider two types of boundary conditions:
(a) Periodic Boundary Conditions. Let A = [0,1]d . We assume that Aγ =
γ−1A ∩ Z
d = [0, 1
γ]d∩Z
d, and then extend the proﬁle ft(u,i) and the conﬁguration
σAγ periodically on Rd and Zd. Equivalently we can identify A with the torus Td and
similarly Aγ with the discrete torus Td,γ.
(b) Fixed Boundary Conditions. In applications it is also useful to consider
the case where the conﬁgurations in some regions do not change with time. Let
Λ ⊂ Γ ⊂ Rd be a region. We think of ∂Λ := Γ\Λ as the “boundary region” where
agents do not revise their strategies. Since we consider compactly supported J we
can take, for suitable r > 0
Γ :=
 
u∈Λ
B(u,r),
where B denotes a ball centered at u with radius r. We deﬁne microscopic spaces,
Λγ := γ−1Λ ∩ Zd and Γγ := γ−1Γ ∩ Zd.
2.3 Main results
Let us consider ﬁrst the case with periodic boundary conditions. Our assumptions
on the interactions weights Wγ (x − y) are
(F) Wγ (x − y) = γdJ (γ(x − y)) where J is nonnegative, continuous with compact
support, and normalized,
 
J(x)dx = 1.
12The mesoscopic strategy proﬁles are described by functions f(u,i) ∈ M(Td × S)
where
M(T
d ×S) :=
 
f ∈ L
∞(T
d × S) : 0 ≤ f(u,i) ≤ 1,
 
i f(u,i) = 1 for all u ∈ T
d
 
.
Let {σ
γ
t}t≥0 be the stochastic process with generator Lγ given by
(L
γg)(σ) =
 
x∈Td,γ
 
k∈S
c
γ(x,σ,k)
 
g(σ
x,k) − g(σ)
 
(15)
for g ∈ L∞(STd,γ). Our assumptions on the strategy revision rate cγ(x,σ,k) are that
there exists a real-valued function
c(u,i,k,π), u ∈ T
d, i,k ∈ S, π ∈ P(T
d × S)
such that
(C1) c(u,i,k,π) satisﬁes
lim
γ→0
sup
x∈Td,γ,σ∈S
Td,γ
,k∈S
|c
γ(x,σ,k) − c(γx,σ(x),k,π
γ(σ))| = 0,
(C2) c(u,i,k,π) is uniformly bounded: i.e., there exists M such that
sup
u∈Td,i,k∈S,π∈P(Td×S)
|c(u,i,k,π)| ≤ M ,
(C3) c(u,i,k,fdudi) satisﬁes a Lipschitz condition with respect to f : i.e., there
exists L such that for all f1, f2 ∈ M(Td × S)
sup
u∈Td,i,k∈S
|c(u,i,k,f1dudi) − c(u,i,k,f2dudi)| ≤ L f1 − f2 L1(Td×S) .
In the appendix we show that all the classes of rates given in the examples in
Section 2.1 and several others satisfy conditions C1−C3. For example, if cγ(x,σ,k) =
F(u(x,σ,k)−u(x,σ,σ(x))), with u(x,σ,i) =
 
y Wγ(x−y)a(i,σ(y)) and the weights
13Wγ(x − y) satisfy condition F, then
c(u,i,k,f) = F
 
 
l∈S
a(k,l)J ∗ f(u,l) − a(i,l)J ∗ f(u,l)
 
(16)
satisﬁes condition C1 − C3 (recall that J ∗ f(u,l) :=
 
Td J(u − v)f(v,l)dv is the
convolution of J with f). A slight modiﬁcation of (16) yields corresponding expres-
sions for each choice of cγ(x,σ,k) in Section 2.1 (see the appendix for the complete list
of these rates). In Section 2.4 we will explain how to obtain the function c(u,i,k,π)
from the rates.
The stochastic process σ
γ
t induces a measure-valued stochastic process π
γ
t :=
πγ(σ
γ
t,dudi) for the empirical given in equation (13). Theorem 1 shows that the
stochastic process π
γ
t has a deterministic limit.
Theorem 1 (Long Range Interaction and Periodic Boundary Condition) Suppose
the revision rate satisﬁes C1 − C3. Let f ∈ M(Td × S) and assume that the initial
distribution { γ}γ is a family of measures with a slowly varying parameter associated
to the proﬁle of f. Then for every T > 0
lim
γ→0
π
γ
t(du,di) = ft(u,i)dudi in probability
uniformly for t ∈ [0,T] and ft satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation: for u ∈
Td,i ∈ S
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) =
 
k∈S
c(u,k,i,f)ft(u,k) − ft(u,i)
 
k∈S
c(u,i,k,f) (17)
f0(u,i) = f(u,i)
Next let us consider ﬁxed boundary conditions as in Section 2.2. In this case, the
stochastic process, {σ
γ
t}t≥0, is speciﬁed by the generator Lγ
(L
γg)(σΓγ) =
 
x∈Λγ
 
k∈S
c
γ(x,σΓγ,k)(g(σ
x,k
Γγ ) − g(σΓγ)) (18)
for g ∈ L∞(SΓγ
). Note that the summation in terms of x in (18) is taken over Λγ,
which represents the fact that only individuals in Λγ revise their strategies, whereas
the rate depends on the conﬁguration in entire Γγ. For a given f ∈ M, we deﬁne its
restriction on Λ, fΛ(u,i) : fΛ(u,i) = f(u,i) if u ∈ Λ and fΛ(u,i) = 0 if u ∈ ΛC.
14Theorem 2 (Long Range Interaction and Fixed Boundary Condition) Suppose
the revision rate satisﬁes C1 − C3. Let f ∈ M(Γd × S) and assume that the initial
distribution { γ}γ is a family of measures with a slowly varying parameter associated
to the proﬁle of f. Then for every T > 0
lim
γ→0π
γ
t(du,di) =
1
|Γ|
ft(u,i)dudi in probability
uniformly for t ∈ [0,T] and ft = fΛ,t + f∂Λ,t satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equa-
tion: for u ∈ Γ,i ∈ S
∂
∂t
fΛ,t(u,i) =
 
k∈S
c(u,k,i,f)fΛ,t(u,k) − fΛ,t(u,i)
 
k∈S
c(u,i,k,f) (19)
f0(u,i) = f(u,i)
Note that c(u,k,i,f) = c(u,k,i,fΛ+ f∂Λ) is given by the similar formula to (16)
with J∗f(u) =
 
Γ J(u − v)f(v)dv for u ∈ Λ; so the rates depend on f∂Λ as well as
fΛ.
2.4 Heuristic derivation of the diﬀerential equations
In this section we justify, heuristically, the IDEs obtained in Theorems 1 and 2.
For simplicity we assume periodic boundary conditions but the other case is similar.
The diﬀerential equations (17) and (19) are examples of input-output equations. In
particular, by summing over the strategy set, it is easy to see that
 
i∈S ft(u,i) is
independent of t and therefore if f0 ∈ M, then ft ∈ M for all t. Also the space
M can be thought of as a product over the space of the standard strategy simplex
∆ of game theory, i.e., M =
 
u∈Td ∆. As shown in evolutionary game theory
textbooks (Weibull, 1995; Sandholm, 2010) one can derive heuristically the ODEs
from corresponding stochastic processes. The main assumption used there is that the
rates depend only on the average proportion of players with a given strategy. In this
section we provide, for the convenience of a reader, a similar heuristic derivation from
microscopic processes in the case of the spatial IDE (17); we replace global average
by spatially localized averages as expressed in the limit of the empirical measure (13).
For microscopic sites x and y, let us denote by u = γx and v = γy the corre-
sponding spatial positions at the mesoscopic level. For the sake of exposition let us
15suppose that cγ(x,σ,k) is given by
c
γ(x,σ,k) = F(u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ(x)).
For any continuous function g on Td × S, by the deﬁnition of the empirical measure
(13) we have the identity
1
|Td,γ|
 
x∈Td,γ
g(γx,σ(x)) =
 
Td×S
g(u,i)π
γ(σ,du,di).
Since
   Td,γ    ≈ γ−d and if we assume that πγ (σ,du,di) → f(u,i)dudi, we obtain
lim
γ→0
 
x∈Td,γ
γ
dg(γx,σ (x)) =
 
Td×S
g(u,i)f(u,i)dudi. (20)
Using (20), we ﬁnd
lim
γ→0
 
x∈Td,γ
γ
dJ (γ(x − y))a(k,σ(y)) =
 
Td×S
a(k,l)J(u−v)f(v,l)dvdl =
 
l∈S
a(k,l)J∗f(u,l).
Therefore if σ(x) = i we then obtain
c
γ(x,σ,k) = F(u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ(x))
= F


 
y∈Td,γ
γ
dJ (γx − γy)a(k,σ(y)) −
 
y∈Td,γ
γ
dJ (γx − γy)a(σ(x),σ(y))


−→
γ→0
F
 
 
l∈S
a(k,l)J∗f(u,l) −
 
l∈S
a(i,l)J∗f(u,l)
 
= c(u,i,k,f),
and this gives equation (16). After having identiﬁed rates, we can now explain how
to derive the IDE (17). We write
 π
γ,g (σ) :=
 
Td×S
g(u,i)π
γ(σ,dudi),  f,g  :=
 
Td×S
g(u,i)f(u,i)dudi,
where we view  πγ,g (σ) as a function of the conﬁguration σ. The action of the
16generator on this function is
Lγ  π
γ,g (σ) =
 
k∈S
 
Td×S
c(u,i,k,π
γ(σ))(g(u,k) − g(u,i))π
γ(σ,dudi).
¿From the martingale representation theorem for Markov processes (for example see
Ethier and Kurz, 1986) there exists a martingale M
g,γ
t such that
 π
γ
t,g  =  π
γ
0,g  +
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
 
Td×S
c(u,i,k,π
γ
s)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))π
γ
s(dudi) + M
g,γ
t .
(21)
As γ → 0, one proves that M
g,γ
t → 0. Thus if π
γ
t(dudi) → f(t,u,i)dudi as γ → 0,
equation (21) becomes
 ft,g  =  f0,g  +
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
 
Td×S
c(u,i,k,fs)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))fs(u,i)dudi
and upon diﬀerentiating with respect to time, we ﬁnd
<
∂ft
∂t
,g >=
 
k∈S
 
Td×S
c(u,i,k,ft)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))ft(u,i)dudi (22)
which is the weak formulation of the IDE (17) obtained by integrating over u and i.
The proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, which we present in the appendix, is
a variation on the proof given in Comets (1987), Kipnis and Landim (1999), and
Katsoulakis, Plechac, and Tsagkarogiannis (2005). Unlike these papers, in the case of
non-innovative dynamics studied here there is no detailed balance condition, however
the mesoscopic limit of the type (14) can still be carried out in the Kac scaling
(6). Using the martingale representation (21), we show that {Qγ}γ , a sequence of
probability laws of {π
γ
t}γ, is relatively compact. We then show that all the limit
points are concentrated on the weak solutions of (19) and on measures absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure. Finally we demonstrate that the weak
solutions of (19) are unique so that we conclude the convergence of Qγ to the Dirac
measure concentrated on the solution of (19).
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Figure 3: The relationships between the microscopic process and the macro-
scopic process and between the stochastic process and the deterministic
approximation.
2.5 Spatially uniform interactions: Mean-ﬁeld Dynamics
The goal of this section is to show that under the assumption of uniform interac-
tions the spatially aggregated process is still a Markov chain (such process is called
lumpable). Furthermore our IDEs reduce then to the usual ODEs of evolutionary
game theory, as it should be. The relationships between the various processes and
diﬀerential equations is illustrated in Figure 3. Let us take periodic boundary condi-
tions and uniform interactions, i.e., J ≡ 1 on Td. Let us further deﬁne the aggregate
variables
η
γ(i) :=
1
|Td,γ|
 
x∈Td,γ
δ(σ(x),i)
which counts the proportion of agents with strategy i in the entire domain Td,γ. Note
that this is obtained, equivalently, by integrating the empirical measure πγ(σ,dudi)
over the spatial domain Td. We observe that ηγ depends on γ only through the size
of the domain nd i.e., nd = 1
γd and nd → ∞ as γ → 0. Furthermore since J ≡ 1, the
payoﬀ u(x,σ,k) depends on σ only through the aggregated variable ηn(i). Indeed,
we have
u(x,σ,k) :=
1
nd
 
y∈Td,n
 
l∈S
δ(σ(y),l)a(k,l) =
 
i∈S
a(k,i)η
n(i)
Thus for the strategy revision rates, if σ(x) = j we deﬁne
c
M(j,k,η
n) := c
γ(x,σ,k),
since the right hand side is independent of x and depends only on σ through the
corresponding aggregate variable ηn. Therefore ηn
t itself is a Markov process as we
18will show in Theorem 3 below, and the state space for ηn
t is the discrete simplex
∆
n =
 
{η(i)}i∈S ;
 
i∈S
η(i) = 1 ,n
dη(i) ∈ N+
 
To capture the transition induced by an agent’s strategy switching, we write
η
j,k(i) =

 
 
η(i) if i  = k,j
η(i) − 1
nd if i = j
η(i) +
1
nd if i = k
Thus ηj,k is the state obtained from η if one agent switches his strategy from j to k.
Theorem 3 Suppose the interaction is uniform, then ηn is a Markov chain with state
space ∆n and generator
L
M,ng(η) =
 
k∈S
 
j∈S
n
dη
n(j)c(j,k,η)(g(η
n,j,k) − g(η
n)). (23)
The factor nd in (23) comes from the fact that in a time interval of size 1, on
average nd strategy switches take place, and among those, ndηn(j) are switches from
agents with type j. Theorem 3 shows that the stochastic process with uniform in-
teractions coincides with multi-type birth and death process in population dynam-
ics (Blume, 1998; Benaim and Weibull, 2003). In addition, following Kurtz (1970),
Benaim and Weibull (2003), and Darling and Norris (2008), or as a special case of
our result (Corollary 4 below) we can obtain mean ﬁeld ODEs. Furthermore, at the
mesoscopic level, the IDEs reduce to the usual ODEs of evolutionary game theory as
follows (See Figure 3). We note that when J ≡ 1, we can deﬁne
ρ(i) :=
 
f(u,i)du = J ∗ f(i)
so c(u,k,i,f) is independent of u and this again allows to deﬁne
c
M(k,i,ρ) := c(u,k,i,f) (24)
19Thus, from the IDE (17) we obtain
dρt(i)
dt
=
 
k∈S
c
M(k,i,ρ)ρt(k) − ρt(i)
 
k∈S
c
M(i,k,ρ). (25)
For example, in the case of the comparing and imitative rate we have
c
M(k,i,ρ) = ρ(i)F
 
 
l∈S
a(i,l)ρ(l) −
 
l∈S
a(k,l)ρ(l)
 
.
If F(s) =
1
κ log(exp(κs) + 1), then F(s) − F(−s) = s and (25) becomes the (imita-
tive) replicator dynamics. Other well-known mean ﬁeld ODEs, such as logit dynamics
and Smith dynamics, are similarly derived by choosing appropriate F. Finally, as a
consequence of Theorem 1 we have the following corollary which is the continuous-
time version of Benaim and Weibull (2003)’s result. To state the result, we write
 ηn u := supi∈S |ηn(i)|.
Corollary 4 (Uniform Interaction; Benaim and Weibull, 2003) Suppose that
the interaction is uniform and that the strategy revision rate satisﬁes C1 − C3. Sup-
pose there exists ρ ∈ ∆ such that the initial condition ηn
0 satisﬁes
lim
n→∞
η
n
0 = ρ in probability
Then for every T > 0
lim
n→∞
η
n
t (i) −→ ρt(i) in probability (26)
uniformly for t ∈ [0,T] and ρt(i) satisﬁes the following diﬀerential equation: for
i ∈ S
dρt(i)
dt
=
 
k∈S
c
M(k,i,ρ)ρt(k) − ρt(i)
 
k∈S
c
M(i,k,ρ) (27)
ρ0(i) = ρ(i) (28)
where cM is given by (24). Moreover, there exist C and ǫ0 such that for all ǫ ≤ ǫ0,
20there exists n0 such that for all n ≥ n0
P
 
sup
t≤T
 η
n
t − ρt u ≥ ǫ
 
≤ 2|S|e
− ndǫ2
TC . (29)
Estimates such as (29) describe the validity regimes of the approximation by mean
ﬁeld models (27) in terms both of agent number n and the time window [0,T]
3 Equilibrium Selection and Pattern Formation
In this section we illustrate the usefulness and the versatility of the IDE’s derived
in Section 2.3 by using a combination of linear analysis and numerical simulations.
We will consider the following equations (see the rates in Section 2.1 and at the
beginning of the Appendix)
(a) Logit/Glauber dynamics: If the rate is given by (8) we obtain the IDE
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) =
exp
  
l∈S a(i,l)J ∗ ft(u,l)
 
 
k∈S exp
  
l∈S a(k,l)J ∗ ft(u,l)
  − ft(u,i)
which generalizes the well-known logit ODE of game theory.
(b) Imitative replicator equation: Let us suppose that the rates are given by
equation (9). Then we obtain
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) =
 
k∈S
 
f(u,k)J ∗ f(u,i)F
 
 
l∈S
(a(i,l) − a(k,l))J ∗ ft(u,l)
 
−f(u,i)J ∗ f(u,k)F
 
 
l∈S
(a(k,l) − a(i,l))J ∗ ft(u,l)
  
(30)
Note that the equation depends explicitly on F. This is to be contrasted with the
replicator ODE which is independent of F whenever F satisﬁes the relation F(t) −
F(−t) = t. This is a purely spatial eﬀect: indeed if we take f(u,i) independent of u
for all i then equation (30) reduces to the replicator ODE.
(c) Biological replicator equation: Note that one can also derive a “replicator
IDE” using a “biological ﬁtness”argument, i.e., the rate of change in the population
of a given type is proportional to the diﬀerence between the ﬁtness of this type and
21the average ﬁtness in the population:
∂
∂t
ft(u,i) = ft(u,i)
 
 
l∈S
a(i,l)J ∗ f(u,l) −
 
k,l∈S
f(u,k)a(k,l)J ∗ f(u,l)
 
This equation, while it still lacks a convincing derivation from a microscopic stochastic
process is an interesting equation in itself and it shares many of the nice properties
of the replicator ODEs.
3.1 Spatio-temporal Linear Stability
In this section we present the linear stability analysis of IDEs around stationary
solutions as a ﬁrst step to understand the generation and propagation of temporal
and spatial morphologies; we refer to Murray (1989) for numerous examples and
applications of linear stability analysis of partial diﬀerential equation models. Let us
consider the following general type of integro-diﬀerential equations:
 
∂f
∂t = F(J∗f,f) in Λ × (0,T]
f(0,x) = f0(x) on Λ × {0}
, (31)
where Λ ⊆ Rd or Λ = Td, f ∈ M(Λ × S),J∗f := (J ∗ f1, J ∗ f2,    , J ∗ fn)T, and
F is smooth in both arguments. First, observe that if f is spatially homogeneous,
i.e., f(u,t) = f(t), then J ∗ f = f(J ∗ 1) = f, and thus the IDE (31) reduces to the
ODE
∂f
∂t
= F(f,f).
This ODE, in turn, is exactly the ODE obtained if the interactions are uniform
J ≡ const. This shows that the spatially homogenous solutions of (31) are exactly
the stationary solutions of the corresponding mean-ﬁeld ODE. In particular every
spatially homogenous stationary solution f0, satisﬁes F(f0,f0) = 0. We record this
observation in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Space Independent Stationary Solutions) f0 is a spatially indepen-
dent stationary solution to (31) if and only if F(f0,f0) = 0.
Next we study spatiotemporal perturbations of such constant states by linearizing
around a spatially homogeneous stationary solution, f0: let f = f0 + ǫD where
22D = D(u,t) and substituting into (31), we obtain
ǫ
∂D
∂t
= F(f0 + ǫJ ∗ D,f0 + ǫD). (32)
For small ǫ we expand the right hand side of equation (32) around ǫ = 0, ignore the
terms of order ǫ2 or smaller and obtain
∂D
∂t
= MJ ∗ D + ND (33)
where (M)i,j :=
∂Fi
∂rj , (N)i,j:=
∂Fi
∂sj, and each derivative is evaluated at (f0,f0). We
can solve (33) explicitly using Fourier transform (see the appendix for details) and
obtain the following
Dispersion Relation: Eigenvalues for the solutions to (33) are given by
λ(k) = eigenvalue(M ˆ J(k) + N) for k ∈ Z
d (34)
where ˆ J (k) =
 
Td J(u)e2πik udu are the Fourier coeﬃcients of J.
In general, dispersion relations are a useful tool to investigate the generation
and early-stage propagation of spatial phenomena for nonlinear PDE or IDE, see for
instance Murray (1989). In our case (34) provides the growth (or decay) rates of
approximate solutions to equation (32). As we will see later, identifying the Fourier
coeﬃcients k which are linearly unstable (i.e., λ(k) > 0) allows us to identify the
regions in phase space where instabilities occur and could lead, coupled with the
nonlinear eﬀects, to the formation of complex spatial structures. Finally, the linear
stability analysis provides us computational benchmarks for our simulations.
3.2 Example: Two-strategy symmetric coordination games
We consider two-strategy symmetric coordination games with payoﬀs (5) being
normalized in a way that a(1,2) = a(2,1) = 0 and a(1,1) > 0, a(2,2) > 0. If
p(u) ≡ f(u,1), using that f(u,1)+f(u,2) = 1 we can write a single equation for p(u)
23and obtain an equation of the form (31) with
Replicator IDE FR(r,s) : = (1 − s)rFκ (β (r − ζ)) − s(1 − r)Fκ (β (ζ − r)) (35)
Logit IDE FL(r,s) : = l(β (r − ζ)) − s (36)
where ζ =
a(2,2)
a(1,1)+a(2,2) , β = a(1,1)+a(2,2), l(t) := 1
1+exp(−t), and Fκ(t) := 1
κ log(exp(κt) + 1)
(recall equation (12)). In equations (35) and (36) r and s are variables representing
J∗p and p, respectively. Note that ζ is the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and β
is positive.
We refer to (35) at κ = ∞ as a replicator IDE, while we also consider the reg-
ularized replicator IDE (35) for κ < ∞, and refer to (36) as a logit IDE. In addi-
tion to the conditions for J stated in Section 2.3, we assume that J is symmetric:
J(x) = J(−x) for x ∈ Λ.
3.2.1 Stationary solutions and their linear stability
To ﬁnd spatially homogenous stationary solutions, we need to set FR (p,p) = 0
and FL (p,p) = 0. Then, for the replicator case p = 0,1, and ζ are three stationary
solutions. In the case of logit dynamics, using l(κz) = 1
2 + 1
2 tanh(κz
2) and changing
the variable, p  → 2p − 1 := u, the diﬀerential equation becomes
∂u
∂t
= −u + tanh(
β
4
(J ∗ u + (1 − 2ζ))) (37)
which is the well-known Glauber mesoscopic equation (DeMasi, Orlandi, Presutti, and Triolo,
1994; Katsoulakis and Souganidis, 1997; Presutti, 2009) with β being the inverse tem-
perature. All known results for (37), such as the existence of traveling wave solutions in
one space dimension and the geometric evolution of interfaces between homogeneous
stationary states in higher dimensions, are directly applicable to the logit dynamics.
Because of this connection, we have the following characterization of stationary so-
lutions to logit dynamics; the proof is the consequence of (37) and the analysis of
Glauber dynamics (Presutti, 2009) or it can easily be done directly.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the game is a coordination game. Then, there exists βC
such that for β < βC there exists one spatially homogenous stationary solution, p1,
and for β > βC there exist three spatially homogenous stationary solutions, p1, p2,
and p3.
24We note here the diﬀerent role of β in each one of the IDEs (35) and (36). Since
β = a11 + a22, β measures the size of payoﬀs in coordination games, capturing the
importance of the game to the players; as β → 0, the payoﬀs become negligible. In
replicator IDEs, a change in β merely corresponds to a time change in IDEs, as we
can easily see from equations (35). As the game become less important, the replicator
system evolves slowly; when the game is for high stakes, the individual’s updating of
strategy and, hence, the time evolution of the system is very fast. By contrast, in
logit dynamics β becomes a parameter capturing the noise level. So when β is small
(high noise), disorder pervades and the system converges everywhere to 1
2; everyone
randomizes between two strategies regardless of the payoﬀs. As β gets higher (less
noise), logit dynamics approach best response dynamics, and the payoﬀs weigh more.
In this situation, the solution converges everywhere to a Nash equilibrium.
Next we examine the linear stability of these stationary solutions. By diﬀerenti-
ating FR, FL, we ﬁnd similarly to (34) the dispersion relations for the replicator IDE:
p = 0 λR(k) = Fκ (−βζ) ˆ J(k) − Fκ (βζ)
p = 1 λR(k) = Fκ (β (ζ − 1)) ˆ J(k) − Fκ (β (1 − ζ))
p = ζ λR (k) =
 
log(2)
κ + βζ (1 − ζ)
 
ˆ J(k) −
log(2)
κ
Table 1: Dispersion Relations for the Replicator IDE
Note that by our assumptions of J, ˆ J(k) is real-valued and | ˆ J(k)| < 1 for all k.
Using this fact, we obtain Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Linear Stability for the Replicator IDE) p = 0,1 are linearly
stable for the replicator dynamics for coordination games.
Figure 4 shows one example of the dispersion relations for p = ζ. Observe that
λ(k) > 0 for k = 0, ±1, ±2 and the solutions to linear equation (33) is of the form,
e2πik x (see appendix). So, when k = 0, the corresponding solution is constant along
space and the eigenvalue λ(0) is the eigenvalue for the linearized equation of the mean-
ﬁeld ODE (27). Thus λ(0) > 0 merely shows that ζ is unstable in mean-ﬁeld ODE,
and when k = 0 we do not expect to observe any non-trivial spatial morphologies. At
k = ±1, the corresponding solution has a period 1, involving cos(x), sin(x) or both
and this solution may grow fast, dominating other solutions with diﬀerent frequencies.
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Figure 4: Dispersion Relation for the mixed strategy equilibrium in reg-
ularized replicator dynamics. The ﬁgure shows the dispersion relation λR(k) at p = ζ.
J(x) = exp
 
−bx2 
/
 
exp
 
−bx2 
dx, b = 20, κ = 20, β = 3,ζ = 1
3.
Note that the nonlinearity of the replicator IDE implies a bound on the solutions, so
that they remain in the simplex, at each spatial location. An initially fast growing
solution may be bounded due to the nonlinearity eﬀects and, hence, may develop to
a spatially heterogeneous solution. This is how we obtain the pattern formation in
Figure 2 (upper panels). For k = ±2, we expect a similar spatial phenomenon, but
now the solution involves cos(2x) or sin(2x). Hence, we anticipate a ﬁner pattern and,
indeed, observe this in the numerical simulation of Figure 2 (lower panels).
In the case of logit dynamics, we note that l′(t) = l(t)(1 − l(t)), hence we easily
obtain the dispersion relation for any stationary solution, p0:
λL(k) = β(1 − p0)p0 ˆ J(k) − 1, k ∈ Z
d (38)
Proposition 2 (Linear Stability for the logit IDEs) Suppose that 0 < ˆ J(k) for
all k. When β < βC, the unique stationary solution p0 is linearly stable. When
β > βC, two stationary solutions, p1, p3, are linearly stable where three stationary
solutions p1,p2, and p3 are arranged in p3 < p2 < p1.
We note that the Gaussian kernel satisﬁes the hypothesis, 0 < ˆ J(k) for all k.
From table 1, we see that the dispersion relation for p = ζ in the replicator IDEs
approaches
λR(k) = βζ(1 − ζ) ˆ J(k) as κ → ∞
and, as a result, λL(k) is less than λR(k) at κ = ∞. Thus, we expect that the unstable
steady solutions of the replicator IDE are ‘more unstable’ than the corresponding ones
for logit dynamics, and developed patterns in the replicator case may persist longer;
this conjecture is numerically conﬁrmed in Figure 8 below.
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Figure 5: Comparison of equilibrium selections in mean-ﬁeld ODEs and
IDEs (Periodic BC). The upper left panel shows population densities of strategy 1 for the
mean replicator ODE and IDE. The upper right panel depicts the case of logit rule. The bottom
panels show the actual solutions of IDEs which were used for the comparison. N = 512. Λ = [−π,π].
dt = 0.001/(0.25N2), a11 = 20
3 , a22 = 10
3 , a12 = a21 = 0. b = 2 for the Gaussian kernel. The initial
density in the upper panel is 1
6 and the initial datum for IDEs is 1{−π
6 < x < π
6}.
Remark: Overall, the linearized analysis depicted in the dispersion relations in Table
1 or in (38) for the deterministic mesoscopic IDE, allows us to easily create a phase
diagram for pattern generation and strategies segregation, i.e. a systematic represen-
tation of the parameter regimes of the microscopic models for which we expect to have
nontrivial spatial structures. On the other hand such calculations, typically referred
to in the engineering literature as ‘systems tasks’, are prohibitive using conventional
Monte Carlo simulations such as the ones in Szabo and Fath (2007), for the complex
microscopic processes in Section 2.1; this is due not only to the expense of spatial
Monte Carlo simulations with many agents and strategies, but even more importantly
to the large number of parameters involved in the microscopic models.
3.2.2 Equilibrium selection: Mean-Field ODE versus Mesoscopic IDE
To understand the importance of spatial interactions in our model compared to
existing mean-ﬁeld models, we investigate the problem of equilibrium selection for
mean-ﬁeld ODEs and spatial, mesoscopic IDEs. We ran numerical simulations of the
solutions to the spatial IDEs and the corresponding mean-ﬁeld ODEs whose initial
values are chosen to be the spatial averages of the initial data to the IDEs.
In the upper panels in Figure 5, we present the comparisons of population den-
27sities of strategy 1 in the coordination game with payoﬀs, a(1,1) =
20
3 , a(2,2) =
10
3 ,
a(1,2) = a(2,2) = 0 . The values for IDE are computed by integrating the corre-
sponding spatial solutions over space. The bottom panels show the evolutions of the
spatial solutions which were used to generate the upper panels. We used both the
replicator and logit equations; the left panels correspond to the replicator equation,
and the right panels describe the logit dynamics. As we see from the upper panels,
the solutions to mean-ﬁeld ODEs converge to the equilibrium where everyone in the
population coordinates to strategy 2, since the initial density 1
6 belongs to the basin
of the attraction of this equilibrium. However, a small island of 1-strategists in the
spatial domain induces a transition toward an equilibrium of coordinating to strategy
1, even though the total population density using strategy 1 is still
1
6. In the replicator
IDE case, the system reaches a metastable state − a state where both strategies co-
exist for a very long time − and form a 1-dimensional pattern similar to Figure 2. In
case of the logit IDE, the propagation of strategy 1 is much faster than the replicator
IDE, and typically the system converges to the equilibrium of coordination to strategy
1. Heuristically, this is because agents located near the island of 1-strategists, but are
playing strategy 2, face a roughly 50% chance of interacting with 1-stategists and 50%
chance of interacting with 2-strategists and, since strategy 1 yields a higher payoﬀ
than strategy 2, these agents are better oﬀ by adopting strategy 1. This mechanism
propagates strategy 1 to the whole spatial domain in IDEs.
In similar simulations, though not reported in the paper, we have observed that
mean-ﬁeld ODEs tend to overestimate the speed of convergence to equilibrium. The
mean-ﬁeld ODE systems converge to equilibrium exponentially fast, while in the
IDEs the convergence is much slower, which represents the fact that patterns are
metastable; for related metastable behavior for scalar reaction-diﬀusion equations we
refer for instance to Carr and Pego (1989).Thus, one needs to exercise caution in
studying equilibrium selection and the convergence of the system using mean-ﬁeld
equations, especially when the spatial consideration of system is important.
3.2.3 Traveling front solution as a way of equilibrium selection: Imitation
versus Perturbed Best Responses
Suppose that the domain is a subset of R with the ﬁxed boundary conditions
or the whole real line R. Then, this provides a natural setting to study traveling
front solutions, see for instance Figure 1. A solution is called a traveling front or
28wave solution if it moves at a constant speed: i.e., a traveling front solution p(x,t)
can be written as P(x − ct) for some constant c and some function P. The exis-
tence of traveling front solutions for the logit dynamics is the direct consequences
of known results for the Glauber equations. When ζ = 1
2, the existence of a unique
standing wave (i.e. c = 0) was proved and when there are three equilibrium states,
the existence of traveling waves was established (DalPasso and DeMottoni, 1991;
DeMasi, T.Gobron, and Presutti, 1995; Orlandi and Triolo, 1997). Particularly, if
ζ < 1
2 one can ﬁnd a solution that satisﬁes P (−∞) = 0 and P (∞) = 1, and travels
at a negative speed. Thus the value of P (∞) propagates to the whole real line and as
t → ∞, the solution becomes 1 everywhere; coordination to a state with the higher
payoﬀs becomes a dominating behavior. However, there is no existing rigorous result,
so far, on the replicator IDE, though we have observed this solution in numerical
simulations.
To compare the traveling wave solutions for each mesoscopic dynamics, we ﬁrst
study the shapes of the standing waves. This is because the shapes of the standing
waves may depend on how “diﬀusive” the system is and the diﬀusiveness of the system
may, in turn, determine the speed of traveling waves. As in the usual analysis of Allen-
Cahn type PDE and Glauber IDE, we believe that the sharpness of the standing wave
varies with the diﬀusion eﬀect of the equations and the more “diﬀusive” the system is,
the faster interfaces move (Carr and Pego, 1989; Katsoulakis and Souganidis, 1997).
As Figure 6 shows, the shape of the standing wave in the replicator dynamics
with κ = ∞ is much sharper than that of the logit dynamics. In other numerical
simulations, we have observed that the shape of the regularized replicator dynamics
depend on κ; as κ become larger, the shape is getting sharper. Since Fκ(t) → [t]+ as
κ → ∞, as κ increases marginal gains from switching to a diﬀerent strategy become
higher in response to increases in the payoﬀ of that strategy; in particular, at κ = ∞,
this marginal gain becomes inﬁnity. Thus in the replicator IDEs of high payoﬀs, there
is a zero probability for actions against the optimal choice, hence the interface is very
sharp. However, the players in the logit dynamics do not have zero probabilities for
doing such an action when an agent is right on the “interface”; i.e., there is a nonzero
probability to select something not optimal. That creates the “mushy” mixed region
of a transition, see the schematic in Figure 1(a) (b). From this observation we infer
that the logit dynamic is more “diﬀusive” than the replicator dynamic with κ = ∞;
hence the interfaces in the logit IDEs would move faster than those in the replicator
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Figure 6: Comparison of standing waves between the replicator and the
logit dynamic (a11 = a22, Periodic BC). The upper left panel shows the time evolution
of the population density of strategy 1 in the replicator dynamic. The upper right panel describes
the case of the logit dynamic. The bottom panel shows the shapes of standing waves in both cases
at time 4. We consider the replicator with κ = ∞. N = 256. Λ = [−π,π]. dt = 0.001/(0.25N2),
a11 = 5, a22 = 5, a12 = a21 = 0. b = 2. The initial datum is 1[− 1
2π, 1
2π]
IDEs. This is numerically exhibited in Figure 7.
We note that in the coordination game used for Figure 7, the equilibrium of coor-
dination to strategy 1 is the one predicted by the existing equilibrium selection theo-
ries (Harsanyi and Selton, 1988; Young, 1998; Hofbauer, Hutson, and Vickers, 1997;
Hofbauer, 1997). Particularly Hofbauer (1997) shows, under the best response dy-
namics, the existence of a traveling wave solution which drives out the equilibrium of
strategy 2, and at the same time propagates the equilibrium of strategy 1. Although
we observe the existence of similar traveling wave solutions under various dynam-
ics, the speed of traveling varies dramatically. As Figure 9 shows the transition is
extremely slow in the replicator equation with κ = ∞. So, when the society is charac-
terized by imitative behaviors and marginal gains from switching is high, our model
predicts that the transition to a “better equilibrium” is very slow and it takes a long
time for equilibrium selection to occur.
Finally we present another comparison between the imitative behavior with the
perturbed best response rule using unequal payoﬀ coordination games (a11 > a22)
with the periodic boundary condition (Figure 8). Observe that the time evolution
of the replicator dynamic IDE in the left panel of Figure 8 corresponds to the 1-
dimensional snap shot of the pattern formation in two dimensional replicator systems
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Figure 7: Comparison of traveling waves between the replicator and the
logit IDEs (Fixed BC). The upper panels show the time paths of the population densities
for strategy 1 in the replicator with κ = 1 (left) and the one with κ = ∞ (right). The lower left panel
shows the case of the logit dynamic. In the bottom right panel we show the shapes of traveling waves
at time 4. N = 256. Λ = [−1,1], ∂Λ = [−3,−1] ∪ [1,3] with the ﬁxed boundary condition p(x) = 0
for x ∈ [−3,−1] and p(x) = 1 for x ∈ [1,3], dt = 0.001/(0.05N2), a11 = 20/3,a12 = a21 = 0. b = 2
for the Gaussian kernel. The initial datum is 1[0,1].
in Figure 2. In Figure 8, the replicator system developed a spatial pattern; in the
logit dynamic all population coordinate to an equilibrium of strategy 1 exponentially
fast. Thus, in a society where agents adopt strategies by imitating their neighbors,
the signiﬁcant proportion of the population may spend a long time in an ineﬃcient
equilibrium, whereas agents with perturbed best response rules coordinate “better”
to an eﬃcient outcome.
Throughout numerical simulations, we frequently observed the development of
patterns in the replicator IDEs, while this is not the case for logit IDEs, except for
the equal payoﬀ coordination games. We have also observed the similar pattern for-
mations in the regularized replicator IDEs for a reasonable range of κ; the regularized
replicator IDEs with κ = 10 showed similar patterns to the replicator IDEs.
3.3 PDE approximations of IDEs
If the interaction kernel J is highly concentrated at the origin, or equivalently,
the density f varies slowly with respect to space, we can consider Jǫ(x) = ǫ−dJ(x/ǫ)
as an interaction kernel for small ǫ. Then by a change of variables and a Taylor
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Figure 8: Replicator versus Logit (Periodic BC). The left panel shows population den-
sity of strategy 1 for the replicator IDE with κ = ∞, and the right panel depicts the population den-
sity in the logit dynamics. N = 512. Λ = [−π,π] with the periodic condition. dt = 0.001/(0.05N2),
a11 = 20/3, a22 = 10/3, a12 = a21 = 0. b = 10. for the Gaussian kernel. The initial datum is
1
2 + 1
10 randcos(2x),where rand denotes a realization of the uniform random variable at each node.
expansion, we ﬁnd
Jǫ ∗ f ≈ f +
ǫ2
2
J2∆f
where we ignore smaller order terms like ǫ3 and ∆f = (∆f1,∆f2,    ,∆fn)T, ∆f1 =
∂2f1
∂r2
1 +    +
∂2f1
∂r2
d
, and J2 =
 
Λ |w|
2 J(w)dw. Thus, by expanding F(f + ǫ2
2 J2∆f,f) in
equation 31 around ǫ ≈ 0 again, we ﬁnd the PDE approximations of IDEs:
∂f
∂t
= F(f,f) +
1
2
ǫ
2J2M∆f (39)
where (M)i,j :=
∂Fi
∂rj , and the derivatives are evaluated at (f,f). Intuitively, the
coordinating behaviors imply that agents try to choose the same strategy as their
neighbors, and this, in turn, means that the density of a given strategy tends to
diﬀuse toward locations where the coordination of that strategy is more likely. This
is how our original IDEs are related to the reaction diﬀusion equations in (39). For
speciﬁc PDE expressions, we ﬁnd
Replicator
∂f
∂t = βf(1 − f)(f − ζ)
+[βf(1 − f) + (1 − f)Fκ (β (f − ζ)) + fFκ (β (ζ − f))] ǫ2
2 J2∆f
Logit
∂f
∂t = l(β (f − ζ)) − f + βl(β(f − ζ))(1 − l(β(f − ζ)))ǫ2
2 J2∆f
(40)
Both PDEs in (40) are reaction diﬀusion equations, whose reaction terms are
of the same functional form as the mean ﬁeld reactions (term βf(1 − f)(f − ζ) in
the replicator and l(β (f − ζ)) − f in the logit). The diﬀusion terms are nonlinear
32as the coeﬃcients of the terms ∆f depend on the strategy density f. In PDE that
Hutson and Vickers (1992), Vickers, Hutson, and Budd (1993), Hofbauer, Hutson, and Vickers
(1997), and Hofbauer (1997) have studied for the existence of traveling wave solutions
and pattern formation, the diﬀusion coeﬃcients are constant, implicitly modeling
‘fast’ diﬀusion of strategies between players at diﬀerent lattice sites in space at the mi-
croscopic level, in contrast to the ‘slow’ strategy updating dynamics; such derivations
of reaction-diﬀusion PDE from interacting particle systems with combined fast/slow
mechanisms are discussed in Durrett (1999) and references therein. However, in
our long-range interaction models the diﬀusion terms are concentration-dependent,
induced by the nonlinearities in the logit and replicator microscopic stochastic dy-
namics, which in turn are heuristically discussed in Figure 1(a). In biology models,
when the population pressure tends to enhance dispersal as the population density
increases, the density dependent reaction diﬀusion models have been used (Murray,
1989; Morishita, 1971; Shigesada, 1980).
Overall the PDEs in (40) provide additional insights for the IDEs in (35) and (36),
and their corresponding microscopic stochastic dynamics. For example, in the case of
(35), when p is close to either 0 or 1 the diﬀusion term is weakest and when p lies in
the intermediate range, the eﬀect becomes strong. This means that the individuals
playing strategy 1 diﬀuse fast, as p reaches
1
2, because it is more likely for them to
play with 2-strategists, so more likely to be uncoordinated. When it is highly likely
to be coordinated, as in p = 0 or 1, the individuals with the corresponding strategy
do not diﬀuse at all.
33A Appendix
A.1 Various strategy revision rates and proof of Theorem 2
Strategy Revision Rates
We show that condition C1−C3 are satisﬁed for the following strategy revision rates:
• c
γ (x,σ,k) = F (u(x,σ,k)) : c(u,i,k,f) = F (
 
l a(i,l)J ∗ f (u,l))
• c
γ (x,σ,k) = F (u(x,σ,k) − u(x,σ,σ (x))) : c(u,i,k,f) = F (
 
l[a(k,l) − a(i,l)]J ∗ f (u,l))
• c
γ (x,σ,k) =
 
y w(x,y,σ,k)F(u(x,σ,k)) : c(u,i,k,f) = J ∗f (u,k)F (
 
l a(k,l)J ∗ f (u,l))
• c
γ (x,σ,k) =
 
y w(x,y,σ,k)F(u(x,σ,k)−u(x,σ,σ (x))) : c(u,i,k,f) = J∗f (u,k)F (
 
l[a(k,l) − a(i,l)]J ∗ f (u,l))
• c
γ (x,σ,k) =
exp(u(x,σ,k)) P
l exp(u(x,σ,l)) : c(u,i,k,f) =
exp(J∗f(u,k)) P
l exp(J∗f(u,l))
if F satisﬁes the global Lipschitz condition:i.e., for all x,y ∈ Dom(F), there exists L > 0 such that
|F(x) − F(y)| ≤ L|x − y|. Note that the list above is far from being exhaustive; one can easily invent various
other rates which satisfy C1−C3. Since the veriﬁcations of the conditions are similar, we will check the
conditions for the following rate (41) in the periodic domain.
c
γ(x,σ,k) = F(
 
y∈Λγ
γ
da(k,σ(y))J(γ(y − x)) −
 
y∈Λγ
γ
da(σ(x),σ(y))J(γ(x − y))) (41)
Lemma 3 The rate given by (41) satisﬁes C1 − C3.
Proof. Let
¯ c
γ(u,i,k,σ) : = F(
 
y∈Λγ
γ
da(k,σ(y))J(u − γy) −
 
y∈Λγ
γ
da(i,σ(y))J(u − γy))
c(u,i,k,π) : = F(|Γ|
  γ×S
a(k,l)J(u − v)π(dvdl) − |Γ|
  γ×S
a(i,l)J(u − v)π(dvdl))
where we associate u to γx and v to γy. First we note that
           
 
y∈Λγ
γ
da(k,σ (y))J(γx − γy) − |Γ|
 
Λ×S
a(k,l)J(rx − v)π
γ(σ,dvdl)
           
≤ (42)
       γ
d −
|Λ|
|Λγ|
       
 
y∈Λγ
a(k,σ(y))J(γx − γy) ≤
     γ
d |Λ
γ| − |Λ|
     M → 0 uniformly in x,σ,k
where M := sup
i,k,u,v
a(i,j)J (u,v). So by using the Lipschitz condition of F, we have
|c
γ(x,σ,k) − c(γx,σ(x),k,π
γ (σ))| ≤ |¯ c
γ(γx,σ(x),k,σ) − c(γx,v,σ(x),k,π
γ(σ))|
≤ L sup
x∈Λγ
σ∈SΛγ
k∈S
         
 
 
y∈Γγ
γ
da(k,σ(y))J(γx − γy) − |Γ|
 
Γ×S
a(k,l)J(γx − v)π(σ,dvdl)
         
 
+
L sup
x∈Λγ
σ∈SΛγ
k∈S
 
         
 
y∈Γγ
γ
da(σ(x),σ(y))J(γx − γy) − |Γ|
 
Γ×S
a(σ(x),l)J(γx − v)π(σ,dvdl)
 
         
→ 0 uniformly in x,σ,k
34Hence C1 is satisﬁed. Since c(u,i,k,π) is uniformly bounded, C2 is satisﬁed. Again C3 follows from the
fact that c(u,i,k,π) is uniformly bounded and F satisﬁes the Lipschitz condition.
Notations
We use the following notations in the proof of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
• {Σ
γ
t } is the stochastic process taking values σt with generator L
γ given in equation (18) and the sample
space D
 
[0,T],S
Γγ 
.
• {Π
γ
t } is the stochastic process for the empirical measure taking values πt with the sample space D([0,T],P(Λ×
S)) and we denote by Q
γ the law of the process {Π
γ
t } and by P the probability measure in the underlying
probability space.
The proof of Theorems 1 and 2 are so similar that we only prove Theorem 2 and leave the modiﬁcations
needed to prove Theorem 1 to the readers.
Martingale Estimates
For g ∈ C (Γ × S) we set
h(σ) :=  π
γ,g  =
1
|Γγ|
 
y∈Γγ
g(γy,σ(y)) (43)
We deﬁne M
g,γ
t , M
g,γ
t   as follows: for g ∈ C(Γ × S)
M
g,γ
t =  Π
γ
t ,g  −  Π
γ
0,g  −
  t
0
L
γ  Π
γ
s,g ds, M
g,γ
t   =
  t
0
 
L
γ  Π
γ
s,g 
2 − 2 Π
γ
s,g L
γ  Π
γ
s,g 
 
ds (44)
Since h is measurable, so M
g,γ
t and  M
g,γ
t   are Ft−martingale with respect to P, where Ft is the ﬁltration
generated by {Σt} (Ethier and Kurz, 1986; Darling and Norris, 2008).
Lemma 4 For g ∈ C(Γ × S) there exist C such that
|L
γ  π
γ,g | ≤ C,
     L
γ  π
γ,g 
2 − 2 π
γ,g L
γ  π
γ,g 
      ≤ γ
dC
Proof. For h in (43),we have
h(σ
x,k) − h(σ) =
1
|Γγ|
(g(γx,k) − g(γx,σ(x))
and so we have equation (45) below. Now let q(σ) :=  π
γ,g 
2 . Then
q(σ
x,k) − q(σ) =
1
|Γγ|
2(
 
y∈Λγ
g(γy,σ
x,k(y)))
2 −
1
|Γγ|
2(
 
y∈Λγ
g(γy,σ(y)))
2
=
1
|Γγ|
2 (g(γx,k) − g(γx,σ(x)))
2 +
2
|Γγ|
2 (g(γx,k) − g(γx,σ(x)))
 
y∈Λγ
g(γy,σ(y))
Thus we have
L
γ  π
γ,g  =
1
|Γγ|
 
k∈S
 
x∈Λγ
c
γ(x,σ(x),k)(g(γx,k) − g(γx,σ(x)) (45)
L
γ  π
γ,g 
2 − 2 π
γ,g L
γ  π
γ,g  =
1
|Γγ|
2
 
k∈S
 
x∈Λγ
c
γ(x,σ(x),k)(g(γx,k) − g(γx,σ(x))
2 (46)
Therefore from C1 − C2, |Γ
γ| ≈ |Γ|γ
−d,and |Λ
γ| ≈ |Λ|γ
−d, the results follow.
35Proposition 3 Let g ∈ C (Γ × S) and τ
γ and δ
γ such that
(1) τ
γ is a stopping time on the process {Π
γ
t : 0 ≤ t ≤ T} with respect to the ﬁltration Ft.
(2) δ
γ is a constant, 0 ≤ δ
γ ≤ T and δ
γ → 0 as γ → 0.
Then for ǫ > 0, there exists C such that
(i) P
 
ω : sup
t∈[0,T]
|M
g,γ
t | ≥ ǫ
 
≤
γ
dCT
ǫ2 and (ii) P
 
ω :
   M
g,γ
τγ+δγ − M
g,γ
τγ
    ≥ ǫ
 
≤
γ
dCδ
γ
ǫ2
and there exists γ0 such that for γ < γ0
(iii) P
 
ω :
         
  τγ+δγ
τγ
L
γ  Π
γ
s,g ds
         
≥ ǫ
 
= 0
Proof. We ﬁrst show (iii). Let C as in Lemma 4. Since δ
γ → 0, there exists γ0 such that δ
γ <
ǫ
2C for
γ ≤ γ0. Then by Lemma 4
 
       
  τγ+δγ
τγ
L
γ  Π
γ
s,g ds
 
       
≤ δ
γC <
ǫ
2
, for γ ≤ γ0.
For (i), let γ be ﬁxed ﬁrst. Since (M
g,γ
0 )
2 −  M
g,γ
0   = 0,P a.e. and (M
g,γ
t )
2 −  M
g,γ
t   is Ft−martingale, by
martingale inequality and Lemma 4, we have,
P
 
ω : sup
t∈[0,T]
|M
g,γ
t | > ǫ
 
≤
1
ǫ2E
 
(M
g,γ
T )
2 
=
1
ǫ2E[ M
g,γ
T  ] ≤
γ
dCT
ǫ2
For (ii), by Lemma 4, Chevyshev inequality, and Doob’s optional stopping, we have
P
 
ω :
   M
g,γ
τγ+δγ − M
g,γ
τγ
    > ǫ
 
≤
1
ǫ2E
 
(M
g,γ
τγ+δγ − M
g,γ
τγ )
2
 
=
1
ǫ2E
  
M
g,γ
τγ+δγ
 
−  M
g,γ
τγ  
 
≤
γ
dCδ
γ
ǫ2
Next we prove an exponential estimate. We let rθ(x) = e
θ|x| − 1 − θ |x| and sθ(x) = e
θx − 1 − θx for x,
θ ∈ R. We deﬁne
φ(σ,θ) :=
 
k∈S
 
x∈Λγ
c
γ(x,σ,k)rθ(h(σ
x,k) − h(σ)), ψ(σ,θ) :=
 
k∈S
 
x∈Λγ
c
γ(x,σ,k)sθ(h(σ
x,k) − h(σ))
Then, from Proposition 8.8 in Darling and Norris (2008), we have for M
g,γ
T in (44)
Z
g,γ
t := exp
 
θM
g,γ
t −
  t
0
ψ(Σ
γ
s,θ)ds
 
is a supermartingale for θ ∈ R. Now we let Cg := 2sup|g(u,i)|, Cc := sup|c
γ(x,σ,k)|.
Lemma 5 (Exponential Estimate) There exist C depends on Cg,Cc,S and ǫ0 such that for all ǫ ≤ ǫ0
we have
P
 
sup
t≤T
|M
g,γ
t | ≥ ǫ
 
≤ 2e
− |Λγ| ǫ2
TC
Proof. We choose ǫ0 ≤
1
2 |S|CgCcT and let A =
1
|Λγ| |S|C
2
gCce, θ =
ǫ
AT . Then since rθ is increasing in R+,
rθ
 
h(σ
x,k) − h(σ)
 
≤ rθ
 
1
|Λγ|
Cg
 
≤
1
2
 
1
|Λγ|
Cgθ
 2
e
1
|Λγ| θCg for all σ ∈ S
Λγ
36where in the last line we used e
x − 1 − x ≤
1
2x
2e
x for all x > 0. Also for ǫ ≤ ǫ0,
1
|Λγ|
θCg =
1
|Λγ|
ǫ
AT
Cg ≤
1
|Λγ|
1
2
|S|C
2
gCc
A
≤
1
2e
< 1
Thus
  T
0
φ(Σ
γ
t ,θ)dt ≤ |S||Λ
γ|
1
|Λγ|
2
1
2
C
2
gθ
2e
1
|Λγ| θCgCcT ≤
1
2
1
|Λγ|
|S|C
2
gCceθ
2T =
1
2
Aθ
2T for all ω ∈ Ω
So, since ψ(σ,θ) ≤ φ(σ,θ),
P
 
sup
t≤T
M
g,γ
t > ǫ
 
= P
 
sup
t≤T
Z
g,γ
t > exp[θǫ −
  T
0
ψ(Σ
γ
t ,θ)dt]
 
≤ P
 
sup
t≤T
Z
g,γ
t > exp[θǫ −
1
2
Aθ
2T]
 
≤ e
1
2Aθ2T−θǫ = e
− |Λγ| ǫ2
TC
where we choose C := 2|S|C
2
gCce. Since the same inequality holds for −M
g,γ
t , we obtain the desired result.
Convergence
Lemma 6 (Relative Compactness) The sequence {Q
γ} in P (D([0,T];P(Λ × S))) is relatively compact.
Proof. By Proposition 1.7 in Kipnis and Landim (1999, p.54), we show that
 
Q
γg
−1 
is relatively compact
in P (D([0,T];R)) for each g ∈ C(Λ×S), where the deﬁnition of Q
γg
−1 is as follows: for any Borel set A in
D([0,T];R)
Q
γg
−1(A) := Q
γ {π. ∈ D ([0,T];P(Λ × S)) :  π.,g  ∈ A}
So, from Theorem 1 in Aldous (1978) and Prohorov Theorem in Billingsley (1968, p.125), it is enough to
show that
(i) for η > 0, there exists a such that
Q
γg
−1
 
x ∈ D([0,T];R) : sup
t
|x(t)| > a
 
≤ η for γ ≤ 1
(ii)
P
 
ω :
    
Π
γ
τγ+δγ,g
 
−  Π
γ
τγ,g 
    > ǫ
 
→ 0
for all ǫ > 0, for (τ
γ,δ
γ) satisfying the condition (1) and (2) of Proposition 3. For (i), since g is bounded, it is
enough to choose a = 2sup|g(u,i)|; i.e., Q
γg
−1 {x ∈ D([0,T];R) : supt |x(t)| > a} = Q
γ{π. : supt | πt,g | >
a} = 0 since | π.,g | < a for all π. For (ii)
P
 
ω :
 
  
Π
γ
τγ+δγ,g
 
−  Π
γ
τγ,g 
 
  > ǫ
 
≤ P
 
ω :
 
 M
g,γ
τγ+δγ − M
g,γ
τγ
 
  >
ǫ
2
 
+ P
 
ω : sup
t∈[0,T]
|M
g,γ
t | >
ǫ
2
 
≤
γ
dCδ
γ
ǫ2 for γ ≤ γ0 chosen in Proposition 3
Let Q
∗ be a limit point of {Q
γ} and choose a subsequence {Q
γk} converging weakly to Q
∗. Hereafter
we denote the stochastic process deﬁned on Λ
γ by
 
Σ
Λγ 
and its restriction on Γ
γ by
 
Σ
Γγ 
. With these
notations, equation (44) becomes
 
Π
Γγ
t ,g
 
=
 
Π
Γγ
0 ,g
 
+
|Λ
γ|
|Γγ|
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
 
Λ×S
c(u,i,k,Π
Γγ
s )(g(u,k) − g(u,i))Π
Λγ
s (dudi) + M
g,γ
t (47)
37Let π ∈ P(Γ × S) and we deﬁne πΛ(du,di) := π(du ∩ Λ,di).
Lemma 7 (Characterization of Limit Points) For all ǫ > 0,
Q
∗
 
π. : sup
t∈[0,T]
 πt,g  −  π0,g  −
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
  
Λ×S
c(u,i,k,πs)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))πΛ,s(dudi)
 
> ǫ
 
= 0,
i.e. the limiting process is concentrated on the weak solutions of the IDE (19).
Proof. First we deﬁne Φ : D([0,T],P(Λ × S)) → R
π.  →
         
sup
t∈[0,T]
 πt,g  −  π0,g  −
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
  
Λ×S
c(u,i,k,πs)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))πΛ,s(dudi)
          
Then Φ is continuous, hence Φ
−1((ǫ,∞)) is open. From the weak convergence of {Q
γk} to Q
∗,
Q
∗ {π. : Φ(π.) > ǫ} ≤ liminf
l→∞
Q
γl {π. : Φ(π.) > ǫ}
Also,
Q
γ {π. : Φ(π.) > ǫ} = P
 
ω : sup
t∈[0,T]
|M
g,γ
t | > ǫ
 
≤
γ
dCT
ǫ2 (by Proposition 3) for γ < γ0
The ﬁrst equality follows from (47) and the following equality:
ΠΛ,s(dudi) =
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ∩Λ
δ(γx,ΣΓγ
s (x))(dudi) =
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Λγ
δ(γx,Σ
Λγ
s (x))(dudi) =
|Λ
γ|
|Γγ|
Π
Λγ
s (dudi).
We denote explicitly by dm ⊗ dv as a product measure of Lebesgue measure on Λ and the counting
measure on S.
Lemma 8 (Absolutely Continuity) We have
Q
∗{π. : πt(dudi) is absolutely continuous with respect to dm ⊗ dv for all t ∈ [0,T]} = 1.
Proof. We deﬁne Φ : D([0,T];P(Γ × S)) → R,π.  → supt∈[0,T] | πt,g |. Then Φ is continuous. Also
| π
γ,g | ≤
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ
|g(γx,σ(x))| ≤
 
l∈S
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ
|g(γx,l)|
Thus
sup
t∈[0,T]
| π
γ
t ,g | ≤
 
l∈S
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ
|g(γx,l)|
We write π
∗
  be a trajectory on which all Q
∗’s are concentrated. Then Π
γ
 
D −→ π
∗
  (convergence in distribu-
tion), so E(Φ(Π
γ
  )) → E(Φ(π
∗
  )). Also
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ |g(γx,l)| →
 
Λ |g(u,l)|du for all l by the Riemann sum
approximation. Thus,
sup
t∈[0,T]
| π
∗
t,g | = Φ(π
∗
  ) = lim
γ→0E(Φ(Π
γ
  )) ≤ lim
γ→0
 
l∈S
1
|Γγ|
 
x∈Γγ
|g(γx,l)| =
 
Γ×S
|g (u,l)|dm ⊗ dv
Therefore, for all t ∈ [0,T], for all g ∈ C(Γ × S),
       
 
Γ×S
g(u,l)π
∗
t(dudl)
        ≤
 
Γ×S
|g (u,l)|dm ⊗ dv
38so for all t ∈ [0,T] π
∗
t is absolutely continuous with respect to dm ⊗ dv.
We also see that all limit points of the sequence {Q
γ} are concentrated on the trajectories that equal
to f
0dudi at time 0, since
Q
∗
 
π. :
   
   
 
g(u,i)π0(dudi) −
1
|Γ|
 
g(u,i)f
0(u,i)dudi
   
    > ǫ
 
≤ liminf
k→∞
Q
γk
 
π. :
       
 
g(u,i)π0(dudi) −
1
|Γ|
 
g(u,i)f
0(u,i)dudi
        > ǫ
 
= 0,
where the deﬁnition of sequence of product measures with a slowly varying parameter implies the last
equality by Proposition 0.4 Kipnis and Landim (1999, p.44).
So far we have shown that Q
∗’s are concentrated on the trajectories that are the weak solutions of the
integro-diﬀerential equations. Next we show the uniqueness of weak solutions deﬁned in the following way.
Let A(f)(u,i) :=
 
k∈S c(u,k,i,f)fΛ(t,u,k) − fΛ(t,u,i)
 
k∈S c(u,i,k,f). For an initial proﬁle f
0 ∈ M,
f ∈ M is a weak solution of the Cauchy problem:
∂ft
∂t
= A(ft), f0 = f
0 (48)
if for every function g ∈ C(Γ×S), for all t < T, ft,g  =
  t
0  A(fs),g ds.Observe that from C3 A satisﬁes the
Lipschitz condition: there exists C such that for all f, ˜ f ∈ L
∞ ([0,T]; L
∞(Γ × S)),
     A(f) − A( ˜ f)
     
L2(Γ×S)
≤
C
     f − ˜ f
     
L2(Γ×S)
.
Lemma 9 (Uniqueness of Weak Solutions) Weak solutions of the Cauchy problem (48) which belong
to
L
∞  
[0,T];L
2(Γ × S)
 
are unique.
Proof. Let ft, ˜ ft be two weak solutions and ¯ ft := ft − ˜ ft. Then, we have
  ¯ ft,g
 
=
  t
0
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs),g
 
ds for all g ∈ C(Γ × S)
We show that t  →
    ¯ ft
   2
L2(Γ×S) is diﬀerentiable. Deﬁne a molliﬁer η(x) := C exp
 
1
|x|−1
 
if |x| < 1, := 0 if
|x| ≥ 1, C > 0 is a constant such that
 
Rd η(x)dx = 1. For ǫ > 0, set ηǫ(x) := ǫ
−dη(ǫ
−1x). For each u ∈ Γ,
i ∈ S, deﬁne h
ǫ
u,i(v,k) = ηǫ (u − v)1{i=k} and
¯ f
ǫ
t(u,i) :=
 
Γ×S
 
ft(v,k) − ˜ ft(v,k)
 
h
ǫ
u,i(v,k)dvdk
Then,
   
 
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs),h
ǫ
u,i
    
  ≤
   
 A(fs) − A( ˜ fs)
   
 
L2
   h
ǫ
u,i
   
L2 ≤ C
   
 fs − ˜ fs
   
 
L2
   h
ǫ
u,i
   
L2 ≤ C sup
s∈[0,T]
   
 fs − ˜ fs
   
 
L2
   h
ǫ
u,i
   
L2 .
Since fs − ˜ fs ∈ L
∞  
[0,T];L
2(Γ × S)
 
and h
ǫ
u,i ∈ C(Γ×S) for each u,i, t  → ¯ f
ǫ
t (u,i) is diﬀerentiable and its
derivative is ¯ f
ǫ′
t (u,i) =
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs),h
ǫ
u,i
 
. Also, it follows that
    ¯ f
ǫ
t
   2
L2 is diﬀerentiable with respect to
t and
d
dt
    ¯ f
ǫ
t
   2
L2 =
 
Γ×S
2
 
A(ft) − A( ˜ ft),h
ǫ
u,i
 
¯ f
ǫ
t (u,i)dudi, so
    ¯ f
ǫ
t
   2
L2 =
  t
0
  
Γ×S
2
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs),h
ǫ
u,i
 
¯ f
ǫ
t(u,i)dudi
 
ds
Then since f
ǫ
t → ft in    L2 and ¯ ft ∈ L
∞  
[0,T];L
2(Γ × S)
 
for a given t, we have |
    ¯ f
ǫ
t
   2
L2 −
    ¯ ft
   2
L2 |
→ 0. Also because
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs),h
ǫ
u,i
 
→ A(ft)(u,i) − A( ˜ ft)(u,i) for a.e.u, and all i,t, by the dominant
39convergence theorem we have
    ¯ ft
   2
L2 =
  t
0
2
 
A(fs) − A( ˜ fs), ¯ fs
 
ds,
so
    ¯ ft
   2
L2 is diﬀerentiable and
d
dt
    ¯ ft
   2
L2 =
 
A(ft) − A( ˜ ft), ¯ ft
 
≤ 2
     A(ft) − A( ˜ ft)
     
L2
    ¯ ft
   
L2 ≤ C
    ¯ ft
   2
L2
Hence from Gronwell lemma, the uniqueness of the solutions follows.
Lemma 10 (Convergence in Probability) We have
Π
γ
t (du,di) −→
1
|Γ|
f(t,u,i)dudi in probability .
Proof. So far we established Q
γ ⇒ Q
∗ (converge weakly) and equivalently Π
γ
  → π
∗
  in Skorohod topology
(topology on D([0,T],P(T
d×S))). If we show that Π
γ
t → π
∗
t weakly in P
 
Γ
d × S
 
or equivalently Π
γ
t
D → π
∗
t
in distribution for ﬁxed time t < T, then we have
Π
γ
t
P → π
∗
t in probability. (49)
Since Π
γ
  → π
∗
  in Skorohod topology implies Π
γ
t → π
∗
t weakly for continuity points of π
∗
  (p.112 Billingsley,
1968), it is enough to show that π
∗
  : t  → π
∗
t is continuous for all t ∈ [0,T] to obtain (49). Let t0 < T and
{gk} a dense family in C(Γ × S). Since
       
  t
t0
 A(π
∗
s),gk ds
        ≤ (t − t0) sup
s∈[0,T]
 A(π
∗
s),gk 
we choose δ ≤ min{1,ǫ}. Then for |t − t0| ≤ δ,
     
  t
t0  A(π
∗
s),gk ds
     
1 +
     
  t
t0  A(π∗
s),gk ds
     
≤
δ sups∈[0,T]  A(π
∗
s),gk 
1 + δ sups∈[0,T]  A(π∗
s),gk 
≤ δ
sups∈[0,T]  A(π
∗
s),gk 
1 + sups∈[0,T]  A(π∗
s),gk 
≤ δ
so  πt − πt0 P(Γ×S) ≤ ǫ and π
∗
  : t  → π
∗
t is continuous, all t ∈ [0,T], thus all t ∈ [0,T] are continuity point
of π
∗
 
Proof of Theorem 2
From Lemma 10 we have, for t < T
Π
Λγ
t (du,di) =
|Γ
γ|
|Λγ|
Π
Γγ
t (du ∩ A,di)
P →
1
|Λ|
ft(du ∩ A,di)
Since ft(u,i)(du ∩ Λ)di = fΛ,t(u,i)dudi, from (21) we obtain
 ft,g  =  f0,g  +
  t
0
ds
 
k∈S
 
Λ×S
c(u,i,k,
1
|Γ|
fsdudi)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))fΛ,s(dudi)
Since |Γ
γ|Π
Γγ
t = |Λ
γ|Π
Λγ
t + |Λ
γc|Π
Λγc
0 , |Γ|Π
Γγ
t
P → ft(u,i)dudi, |Λ|Π
Λγ
t
P → fΛ,t(u,i)dudi, and |Λ
c|Π
Λγc
0
P →
fΛc(u,i)dudi, we have ft = fΛ,t + fΛc for all t.
40A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
To do this ﬁrst we deﬁne a reduction mapping, φ : S
Λn
→ ∆
n,
σ  → φ(σ), φ(σ)(i) :=
1
|Λn|
 
y∈Λn
δσ(y)({i})
For g ∈ L
∞(∆
n;R) we let f := g ◦ φ ∈ L
∞(S
Λn
;R), where f(σ) = g(η). Then for η = φ(σ), we have
f(σ
x,k) − f(σ) = g(η
σ(x),k) − g(η) since
φ(σ
x,k)(i) =
1
nd
 
y∈Λn
δσ(y)({i}) +
1
nd δk({i}) −
1
nd δσ(x)({i}) = η
σ(x),k(i)
Proof of Theorm 3. We check the case of imitative and comparing rates. Other cases can be treated as
a special case. By writing m
n(k) :=
 
l a(k,l)η
n(l), we ﬁnd
Lnf(σ) =
 
k∈S
 
x∈Λn
η(k)F(m
n(k) − m
n(σ(x)))(g(η
σ(x),k) − g(η))
=
 
k∈S
 
j∈S


 
x∈Λn
δσ(x)({j})

η(k)F(m
n(k) − m
n(j))(g(η
j,k) − g(η))
=
 
k∈S
 
j∈S
n
dη(j)η(k)F(m
n(k) − m
n(j))(g(η
j,k) − g(η)) :=
 
k∈S
 
j∈S
n
dc
M(η,j,k)(g(η
j,k) − g(η))
Thus we obtain
L
ng(η) =
 
k∈S
 
j∈S
n
dc
M(η,j,k)(g(η
j,k) − g(η))
and this makes {ηt} a Markov chain and the rate is given by c
M(η,j,k).
A.3 Proof of Corollary 4
Proof. It is enough to prove the exponential estimate. From (21) we recall that
 
Π
γ
t ,g
 
=
 
Π
γ
0,g
 
+
  t
0
 
k∈S
 
Td×S
c(u,i,k,Π
γ
s)(g(u,k) − g(u,i))Π
γ
s(dudi)ds + M
g,γ
t
for g ∈ C(T
d × S). By taking g(u,i) = 1 if i = l, g(u,i) = 0 otherwise, we ﬁnd
η
n
t,l = η
n
0,l + n
d
  t
0
 
 
i∈S
c
M(i,l,η
n
s)η
n
s,l −
 
k∈S
c
M(l,k,η
n
s)η
n
s,l
 
ds + M
l,n
t
We deﬁne βl(x) :=
 
i∈S c
M(i,l,x)xl −
 
k∈S c
M(l,k,x)xl. Thus we have
η
n
t,l = η
n
0,l + n
d
  t
0
βl(η
n
s)ds + M
l,n
t , ρt,l = ρ0,l +
  t
0
βl(ρs)ds
From Lemma 5, we have P
 
supt≤T
     M
l,n
t
      ≥ δ
 
≤ 2e
−nd δ2
TC0 for each l and for δ ≤ δ0, where we note that
the choices of C0 and δ0 does not depend on g since |g(u,i)| ≤ 1 for all u,i. Thus, P
 
supt≤T  M
n
t  u ≥ δ
 
≤
412|S|e
− ndδ2
TC0 . Therefore for t ≤ T, using the Lipschitz condition of β we obtain
sup
τ≤t
 η
n
τ − ρτ u ≤  η
n
0 − ρ0 u + L
  t
0
sup
τ≤s
 η
n
τ − ρτ u ds + sup
t≤T
 M
n
t  u
For ǫ0 in Lemma 5, we let δ =
1
3e
−LTǫ for ǫ < ǫ0 and deﬁne
Ω0 =
 
ω :  η
n
0 − ρ0 u ≤ δ
 
, Ω1 =
 
ω : sup
t≤T
 M
n
t  u ≤ δ
 
Then when ω ∈ Ω0 ∩ Ω1, we have supτ≤T  η
n
τ − ρτ u ≤ 2δe
LT by Gronwell lemma. Choose n0 such that
 η
n
0 − ρ0 u ≤ δ for a.e. ω for n ≥ n0. Then for ǫ ≤ ǫ0 and n ≥ n0,
P
 
sup
τ≤T
 η
n
τ − ρn  ≥ ǫ
 
≤ P (Ω
c
0) + P (Ω
c
1) ≤ P
 
ω :  η
n
0 − ρ0 u ≥ δ
 
+ P
 
ω : sup
t≤T
 M
n
t  u ≥ δ
 
≤ 2|S|e
− ndδ2
TC0 = 2|S|e
− ndǫ2
TC
where C := 9C0e
2LT.
A.4 Solutions of Linear IDE
Applying Fourier transform to (33) element by element, we obtain
∂ ˆ D(k)
∂t
= (M ˆ J(k) + N) ˆ D(k) (50)
for each k ∈ Z
d and ˆ D(k) ∈ C
|S|. By solving the ODE system (50) for each k and using the inverse formula,
we obtain
D(x,t) =
 
k∈Z
e
(M ˆ J(k)+N)tˆ g(k)e
2πix k
where e
(M ˆ J(k)+N)t is |S| × |S| matrix, ˆ g(k) is |S| × 1 vector.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. First we note that p1 > ζ, p2,p3 < ζ , limκ→∞ p2 = ζ,
β(1 − l(β(pi − ζ)))l(β(pi − ζ)) < 1 for i = 1,3, β(1 − l(β(pi − ζ)))l(β(pi − ζ)) > 1 for i = 2.
Suppose that β > βC and consider p1. Since l(β(p1−ζ)) = p1, we have β(1−p1)p1 < 1. Then since ˆ J(k) ≤ 1
for all k, we have
λ(k) = β(1 − p1)p1 ˆ J(k) − 1 < β(1 − p1)p1 − 1 < 0
Thus p1 is linearly stable. Similar argument shows that p3 is linearly stable.
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